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I. INTRODUCTION
Should the law punish the dead? If so, should the courts or the
legislature decide the issue? These questions arise in the context of
punitive damages. Punitive, or exemplary, damages are generally
awarded to punish and deter certain wrongful conduct. In some
situations, however, an exemplary award may not advance these
longstanding purposes of punitive damages. Specifically, a tortfeasor
who dies before damages are levied can no longer be punished or
deterred. Thus, a punitive award, in such situations, would frustrate the
purposes of punitive damages. For these reasons, a majority of
jurisdictions agree that punitive damages cannot be awarded against a
deceased tortfeasor’s estate. However, courts in a growing minority of
states, including Ohio, have held to the contrary.
On July 7, 2014, in Whetstone v. Binner, the Ohio Fifth District
Court of Appeals, consisting of a divided three-judge panel, held that a
plaintiff injured in a tort action could recover punitive damages against a
deceased tortfeasor’s estate. 1 In its decision, the court acknowledged a
jurisdictional split on the issue. 2 Nevertheless, the court adopted the
position and reasoning followed by a minority of jurisdictions. 3
The facts that gave rise to the issue at bar are as follows: the great
aunt of two small children, aged five and two, was responsible for
watching over and caring for the children. 4 The great aunt assaulted the
five-year-old girl by “strangling and attempting to suffocate her while
restraining her against her will.” 5 The children’s mother arrived home
during the chaos to find the great aunt with a pillow over her daughter’s
face and a hand around her daughter’s neck. 6 The mother freed her
daughter from the great aunt’s grasp and fled the house with the great
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.) (one justice dissenting).
Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 22.
Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 26.
Merit Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 6, Whetstone v. Binner, No. 2014-1462.
Id.
Id.
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aunt “chasing after her and her children.” 7
The plaintiff-mother filed suit against the great aunt alleging
assault, battery, false and/or unlawful imprisonment, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 8 Importantly, a judgment was entered
against the defendant-great aunt while she was alive. 9 Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a suggestion of death indicating that the defendant-great
aunt died and that the great aunt’s daughter was appointed administrator
of the estate. 10 At the hearing on damages, after the great aunt’s death,
the trial court awarded $500 in compensatory damages for lost wages to
the plaintiff-mother, $1,000 in non-economic damages for past and
future emotional distress to the unharmed two-year-old child, and
$50,000 in non-economic damages to the five-year-old for physical
injury and past and future emotional harm and distress. 11 However, the
trial court declined to award punitive damages to the plaintiff, reasoning
that “punitive damages cannot be awarded against the estate of a
tortfeasor who is deceased.” 12
The Fifth District Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court
and, thus, aligned Ohio with a small minority of jurisdictions that allows
punitive damages to be imposed against a deceased tortfeasor’s estate. 13
The Supreme Court of Ohio granted certiorari and, thereafter, heard oral
arguments on the case. 14 On March 15, 2016, the Court, in a 4-3
decision, upheld the appellate decision, concluding that “a punitivedamages award is available in the limited circumstances presented
here.” 15
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice O’Connor acknowledged a
jurisdictional split on the threshold issue of whether punitive damages
may be imposed against an estate. 16 However, the court did not
expressly align Ohio with either the majority or minority, and, instead,
decided the case on the facts presented. The Court’s analysis focused on
the fact that the defendant was alive when the trial court entered
judgment against her for assault, false imprisonment, emotional distress,
7. Id.
8. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 3.
9. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 4.
10. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 6.
11. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 10.
12. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 6 (citing Mongold v. Estate of Gilbert, 114 Ohio Misc.
2d 32, 35-36, 758 N.E.2d 1245, 1247-49 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2000)).
13. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 26. See also Appendices C and D infra for a list of
minority jurisdictions.
14. Whetstone v. Binner, 141 Ohio St.3d 1473, 25 N.E.3d 1080 (Table), 2015-Ohio-554.
15. Whetstone v. Binner, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-1006, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
16. Whetstone, 2016-Ohio-1006 at ¶ 17-18.
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and loss of consortium. 17 For that reason, the Court ultimately held that
“in cases in which liability has been determined while the tortfeasor is
alive, punitive damages are available to the plaintiff.” 18 Nevertheless,
the actual effect of such a holding in this case is that punitive damages
may be imposed against the defendant’s estate because, at the time of the
Court’s decision, she was deceased and any punitive award would be
paid by her estate.
Two justices authored dissenting opinions. 19 Each dissenter
expressed that the appellate decision should be reversed because the
imposition of punitive damages against an estate does not further the
espoused purposes of punitive damages in Ohio. 20 The effect of the Ohio
Supreme Court’s majority opinion has left uncertainty in the law as to
whether punitive damages may be imposed against a deceased tortfeasor
in Ohio. Although the Court held that punitive damages could be
awarded against an estate in the limited circumstances of Whetstone, 21 it
did not express a bright line rule on the threshold issue. The appellate
decision, in contrast, did acknowledge that its decision placed Ohio in
the minority. 22 For the following reasons, this Comment argues that both
the appellate and Supreme Court decisions are contrary to the
longstanding purposes of punitive damages.
While other jurisdictions have offered different reasons for
awarding punitive damages, the Supreme Court of Ohio has repeatedly
expressed that punishment and deterrence are the only two purposes that
should be considered when imposing punitive awards. 23 The appellate
holding in Whetstone v. Binner is contrary to the Supreme Court’s prior
interpretation of punitive damages in that the Whetstone holding does
not truly advance these espoused purposes. General deterrence alone is
not a sufficient reason to support the recovery of punitive damages
following the death of the tortfeasor. Not only is the appellate court’s
reasoning contrary to Ohio common law, its holding is not supported by
statute, and negative policy concerns arise from the holding. 24 The
Supreme Court of Ohio’s prior decisions align with the majority view
that punitive damages cannot be awarded in such situations.
Furthermore, the legislature may be better suited to address the issue at
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Whetstone, 2016-Ohio-1006 at ¶ 21-24.
Whetstone, 2016-Ohio-1006 at ¶ 24.
See generally Whetstone, 2016-Ohio-1006 at ¶ 28-45.
See Whetstone, 2016-Ohio-1006 at ¶28-45.
Whetstone, 2016-Ohio-1006 at ¶ 1.
Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.).
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Parts III.A, III.B, and IV.
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bar and, if so, should adopt a statute contrary to the Whetstone holding.
Thus, whether it does so judicially or statutorily, Ohio should adopt the
majority view that a claim for punitive damages cannot survive the death
of the tortfeasor.
Part II of this Comment provides the background information
necessary for a meaningful discussion of the issue, including an
overview of compensatory and punitive damages, as well as state
survival statutes, and the relevant law specific to Ohio in comparison to
other jurisdictions. Part III analyzes whether Ohio should impose
punitive damages against the estates of tortfeasors. Part IV discusses the
broader policy implications of the majority and minority views and
whether the courts or the legislature is better suited to address the issue.
Finally, Part V embraces the ultimate conclusion that Ohio should adopt
the majority position and disallow punitive damages after the death of a
tortfeasor. It also suggests that either the Ohio General Assembly or the
Supreme Court of Ohio should overrule the appellate holding in
Whetstone.
II. BACKGROUND
Part A of this section discusses the types of damages awarded in
tort actions; compensatory damages are discussed in Part A.1 and
punitive damages are discussed in Part A.2. Part B discusses how
punitive damages are awarded in Ohio and the applicable Ohio statutes
while Part C introduces survival statutes, both in Ohio and other states.
Part D outlines the seminal court cases in Ohio that discuss whether a
deceased tortfeasor’s estate is liable for punitive damages. Finally, Part
E outlines the discussion of the issue in other jurisdictions and the
majority and minority views across those jurisdictions.
A. General Damages in Tort Actions
Generally, a plaintiff files suit against an alleged wrongdoer in
order to receive some type of remedy. Remedies can include injunctions
and declaratory judgments issued by a court, but most tort plaintiffs seek
damages against the defendant. “Damages have been defined to be the
compensation which the law will award for an injury done . . . .” 25 In
other words, the term “damages” describes an award for a legally
recognized harm. 26 Intentional torts, such as assault or battery, are
25.
26.
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inherently harmful to the plaintiff, and, thus, the plaintiff is always
entitled to some form of relief. 27 Furthermore, damages are one of the
four elements of a negligence claim. 28 The remainder of this section will
discuss two types of damages awarded in tort actions: compensatory
damages and punitive damages.
1. Compensatory Damages
The most common type of damages recoverable by a plaintiff in a
tort action is compensatory damages. 29 Compensatory damages are
designed to repay the plaintiff for losses that resulted from the tort. 30 The
goal of compensatory damages is that the plaintiff should be restored to
her original position before the injury as if the harm had never taken
place. 31 Thus, such damages may not exceed the amount that makes the
plaintiff whole. 32 Compensatory damages may include awards for lost
earnings, medical expenses, emotional distress, and mental and physical
pain and suffering, among many other things. 33 There are also several
other types of damages available to tort victims, including nominal,
liquidated, and punitive damages.
2. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages go beyond the purposes of compensatory
damages. The term “punitive” is defined as “[i]nvolving or inflicting
punishment.” 34 The United States Supreme Court has stated that the
primary purposes of such damages are to “punish[] . . . the guilty, to
deter from any such proceeding for the future, and [to prove] the
detestation of the jury to the action itself.” 35 Thus, in certain situations, a
plaintiff may be entitled to additional damages where certain types of
conduct are involved. 36 Punitive damages are “allowable in excess of the
actual loss where a tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice,

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 28 Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015).
32. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 31 Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015).
33. See DOBBS, supra note 26, at 1047-62. Compensatory damages may also be awarded for
invasions of constitutional rights and harms to property. See id. at 1053-56.
34. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1354 (9th ed. 2009).
35. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 87 (1897) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. DOBBS, supra note 26, at 1062.
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deliberate violence, or oppression.” 37
Courts generally cite two primary reasons for the awarding of
punitive damages: to punish and to deter. 38 As expressed in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, punitive damages are meant to punish
the tortfeasor for the wrongful act and to discourage the tortfeasor,
specifically, and the public, generally, from committing similar
conduct. 39 However, some jurisdictions award punitive damages for
other reasons, including where compensatory damages were insufficient
to make the plaintiff whole. 40 Still, other courts use punitive awards to
compensate “a plaintiff for the humiliation, sense of outrage, and
indignity resulting from injuries maliciously, wilfully and wantonly
inflicted by the defendant.” 41 While most courts focus on the punishment
and deterrence of the tortfeasor in awarding punitive damages, a
minority of jurisdictions emphasizes “the harm done the plaintiff” as
well as other purposes. 42
Courts treat compensatory and punitive awards quite differently. 43
Fundamentally, compensatory damages cannot enhance the plaintiff’s
situation, while punitive damages effectively compensate far beyond
making the injured party whole. Compensatory damages may be reduced
by a plaintiff’s comparative negligence or some other mitigating factor,
yet punitive damages are generally not decreased under similar
circumstances. 44 Also, courts and legislatures often impose a higher
burden of proof for the recovery of punitive damages. 45
Nearly all jurisdictions permit judges and juries to assess punitive
damages against the tortfeasor. 46 Punitive damages are only available to
the plaintiff where the tortfeasor acted with bad intent or malice. 47 There
must be “some element of outrage” due to the tortfeasor’s malicious

37. Scott, 165 U.S. at 86.
38. DOBBS, supra note 26, at 1063; See also Freudeman v. Landing of Canton, 702 F.3d 318,
330 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Ohio law). Punishment and deterrence are often referred to as the
“twin aims” of punitive damages.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
40. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2000 MT 55, ¶ 45, 298 Mont. 438, 995 P.2d 1002.
41. Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
42. Id.
43. Timothy R. Robicheaux & Brian H. Bornstein, Punished, Dead or Alive: Empirical
Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages Against Deceased Defendants, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 393, 395 (2010).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 86 (1897).
47. Id.
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intent or reckless indifference to others. 48 For example, an Ohio jury
awarded a decedent’s estate $15 million in punitive damages where the
defendant’s train struck and killed the decedent, and the defendant could
have easily prevented the accident. 49
B. Punitive Damages in Ohio
Ohio has codified the procedure for recovering punitive damages. 50
Revised Code 2315.21 allows for a plaintiff’s recovery of punitive
damages only where the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor “demonstrate
malice or aggravated or egregious fraud, or that defendant as principal or
master knowingly authorized, participated in, or ratified actions or
omissions of an agent or servant that so demonstrate.” 51 In addition, the
trier of fact must first determine whether the plaintiff may recover
compensatory damages before awarding punitive damages. 52 “The
compensatory-damages requirement prevents plaintiffs from bringing
cases solely for an award of punitive damages . . . .” 53 Punitive damages
“are not independent remedies.” 54 Furthermore, a plaintiff may not
recover punitive damages of more than twice the amount of the
plaintiff’s compensatory award. 55
Pursuant to R.C. 2315.21 (the punitive damages statute), the factfinder must determine that the tortfeasor committed the act with “actual
malice” before the plaintiff is eligible to receive punitive damages. 56
“Actual malice” for the purposes of awarding punitive damages is “(1)
that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is characterized by
hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the
rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing
substantial harm.” 57
Revised Code 2315.21 provides the framework for the awarding of
punitive damages. However, punitive awards developed from the
common law, and Ohio courts have molded the doctrine through judicial
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1979).
49. Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp., 715 N.E.2d 546, 550 (Ohio 1999).
50. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass.
2015-2016).
51. § 2315.21(C)(1) (Westlaw).
52. § 2315.21(C)(2) (Westlaw).
53. Niskanen v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 122 Ohio St. 3d 486, 2009-Ohio-3626, 912 N.E.2d 595, ¶
13.
54. Niskanen at ¶ 13.
55. § 2315.21(D)(2)(a) (Westlaw).
56. Preston v. Murty, 512 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ohio 1987).
57. Id.
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decisions. 58 Specifically, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[t]he
purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate a plaintiff, but to
punish and deter certain conduct.” 59 The punishment of the tortfeasor
should not go beyond the twin aims of punitive damages, and the
primary focus of punitive awards should be the defendant-tortfeasor
rather than the plaintiff. 60
C. State Survival Statutes
State survival statutes play an important role in bringing an action
and recovering damages following the death of a litigant. Survival
statutes provide deceased litigants with the same rights had the death not
occurred. 61 Thus, a living or deceased plaintiff may institute a cause of
action and seek damages against a deceased defendant’s estate under
such statutes. 62 At common law, actions that could survive the death of
the tortfeasor generally only included injuries to property. 63 However,
many states, including Ohio, have modified the common-law survival
standards through statute by expanding or restricting the causes of action
that survive. 64
Revised Code 2305.21 provides: “In addition to the causes of action
which survive at common law, causes of action for mesne profits, or
injuries to the person or property, or for deceit or fraud, also shall
survive; and such actions may be brought notwithstanding the death of
the person entitled or liable thereto.” 65 In construing R.C. 2305.21, Ohio
courts have permitted claims for intentional or reckless infliction of
emotional distress, pain and suffering, legal malpractice, and a claim
under the Consumer Sales Practices Act following the death of the party
entitled to or liable for damages. 66 Claims for worker’s compensation,
58. Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St. 3d 77, 2002-Ohio-7113, 781
N.E.2d 121, ¶ 188 (citing Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277 (Ohio 1859)).
59. Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 343 (Ohio 1994). See also Dardinger
at ¶ 178; Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St. 3d 240, 2002-Ohio-3994, 773 N.E.2d 526, ¶ 21.
60. Dardinger at ¶ 178.
61. Robicheaux & Bornstein, supra note 33, at 397.
62. Id.
63. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51 Westlaw (database updated Nov.
2015).
64. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 52 Westlaw (database updated Nov.
2015).
65. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass.
2015-2016).
66. See Williams v. Barrick, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-133, 2008-Ohio-4592, ¶ 10
(emotional distress); Dickerson v. Thompson, 624 N.E.2d 784, 787 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (pain and
suffering); Loveman v. Hamilton, 420 N.E.2d 1007, 1008 (Ohio 1981) (legal malpractice); Estate of
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slander, libel, violation of civil rights, and malicious prosecution do not
survive the death of a liable or entitled party under R.C. 2305.21. 67
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Rubeck v. Huffman, permitted a
deceased party’s next of kin to recover punitive damages against a living
defendant pursuant to the Survival Statute.68 Based upon the high court’s
ruling in Rubeck and the Survival Statute, the Fifth District Court of
Appeals held that a claim for punitive damages could survive the death
of the tortfeasor and could be awarded against the decedent’s estate
under R.C. 2305.21. 69
One state, Georgia, expressly prohibits the recovery of punitive
damages following the death of the tortfeasor in its survival statute.70
The Georgia code provides that actions for a tort, homicide, or injury do
not abate with the death of either the plaintiff or the defendant. 71
However, the statute contains a clause that specifically bars the recovery
of punitive damages against the personal representative of a
wrongdoer. 72 In contrast, two states expressly allow the recovery of
punitive damages in their survival statutes.73 The relevant Texas statute
provides: “When the death is caused by the wilful act or omission or
gross negligence of the defendant, exemplary as well as actual damages
may be recovered.” 74 Oklahoma’s wrongful death statute states that “[i]n
proper cases . . . punitive or exemplary damages may also be recovered
against the person proximately causing the wrongful death or the
person’s representative if such person is deceased.” 75

Cattano v. High Touch Homes, Inc., 6th Dist. Erie No. E-01-022, 2002-Ohio-2631, ¶ 44 (Consumer
Sales Practices Act).
67. See Hook v. Springfield, 750 N.E.2d 1162, 1167 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (worker’s
compensation); Oakwood v. Makar, 463 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (slander); Stein-Sapir
v. Birdsell, 673 F.2d 165, 167 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (applying Ohio law) (libel); Alsup v.
Int’l Union of Bricklayers, 679 F. Supp. 716, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (applying Ohio law) (violation
of civil rights); State ex rel. Crow v. Weygandt, 162 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ohio 1959) (malicious
prosecution).
68. 374 N.E.2d 411, 413-14 (Ohio 1978) (per curiam).
69. Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.).
70. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-2-41 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.).
71. § 9-2-41 (Westlaw).
72. § 9-2-41 (Westlaw).
73. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 399 (End) of the First
Sess. of the 55th Legislature (2015)); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.008, 71.009
(West, Westlaw through end of 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 84th Legislature).
74. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.009 (Westlaw).
75. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053(C) (Westlaw).
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D. Claims for Punitive Damages Following the Death of the Tortfeasor
in Ohio Courts
The appellate decision in Whetstone stated that the issue was one of
first impression among Ohio appellate courts. However, at least one
court has opined on whether punitive damages may be imposed against
an estate. 76 Furthermore, the Whetstone court addressed two Ohio
common pleas court decisions that came to conflicting conclusions on
the issue. 77 In Mongold v. Estate of Gilbert, the common pleas court held
that punitive damages could not be awarded against a tortfeasor’s
innocent heirs following the death of the tortfeasor. 78 The court was
concerned that a decision to the contrary would impede the goals of a
punitive award. 79 Specifically, the court reasoned that “the purpose of
punishment cannot be separated from the purpose of deterrence.” 80
Furthermore, “[t]hrough death, the tortfeasor is no longer subject to legal
punishment,” and “the purpose of using the tortfeasor as an example to
others to deter their behavior is greatly diminished, if not completely
frustrated.” 81
In contrast, another Ohio common pleas court came to the opposite
conclusion in Individual Business Services, Inc. v. Carmack.82 In a short
opinion, the trial court held that it was not persuaded by the Mongold
court’s view “that a decedent’s estate is immune from an award of
punitive damages since the decedent is no longer available to be
punished.” 83 The court cited Rubeck v. Huffman and R.C. 2305.21, as
well as the theory of general deterrence, in support of its decision. 84 In
addition, the court reasoned that because punitive damages are inherent
in a cause of action for fraud, and because R.C. 2305.21 allows causes of
action for fraud to survive, R.C. 2305.21 allows punitive damages to be
awarded against a deceased tortfeasor’s estate.85 The courts’ decisions in
76. Friedman v. Lobos, 23 Ohio Law Abs. 217, 221 1936 WL 2151, *6 (7th Dist.) (holding
that “[s]ince the purpose of awarding exemplary damages is to punish the wrongdoer, as a rule his
death destroys the right to them and they can not be recovered against his estate or his heirs or other
representatives). The Friedman case was factually different from Whetstone, however, in that the
defendant in Friedman died before a judgment was entered against him rather than after. Id. at 218.
77. Whetsone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶¶ 17-21 (5th Dist.).
78. 114 Ohio Misc. 2d 32, 36, 758 N.E.2d 1245, 1249 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2000).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Montgomery C.P. No. 2004 CV 08159, 2009 WL 8235992, at *3 (Dec. 17, 2009).
83. Id.
84. Id. at *3-4.
85. Id. at *3. The Whetstone court later followed the same reasoning in its decision.
Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.).
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Mongold and Individual Business Services essentially outlined the
majority and minority views on the issue.
E. Claims for Punitive Damages Following the Death of the Tortfeasor
in Other Jurisdictions
A majority of jurisdictions has held that a claim for punitive
damages cannot survive the death of the tortfeasor. 86 Fourteen states
have enacted statutes that disallow punitive damages to be awarded
against a decedent’s estate. 87 In addition, thirteen other states, and the
District of Columbia, have judicially adopted the majority view. 88 A
minority of jurisdictions, on the other hand, has held to the contrary—
that punitive damages can survive the death of a tortfeasor. 89 Two states,
by legislative action, have allowed punitive damages to be awarded
against a decedent’s estate,90 while nine states have adopted the minority
view through appellate court decisions. 91
1. Majority Jurisdictions
Most jurisdictions agree that a claim for punitive damages does not
survive the death of the tortfeasor. 92 Courts deciding the issue in
jurisdictions that award punitive damages pursuant to the traditional twin
aims reason that punishment and deterrence are not satisfied where the
tortfeasor is deceased. 93 In addition, these courts argue that punishing
the estate inflicts harm on the innocent heirs rather than the true
wrongdoer. 94 Furthermore, the plaintiffs, in such cases, have already
86. For purposes of this Comment, a “majority jurisdiction” includes any state that has
disallowed the recovery of punitive damages after the death of the tortfeasor, whether by appellate
court decision or statute. For a discussion of both the majority and minority views on this subject
and empirical data, see G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1129-30 & nn.4 & 6 (Pa. 1998); Emily
Himes Iversen, Note, Invading The Realm Of The Dead: Exploring The (Im)propriety Of Punitive
Damage Awards Against Estates, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 827, 831-35 (2014); Robicheaux &
Bornstein, supra note 33, at 410.
87. See infra Appendix B.
88. See infra Appendix A.
89. For purposes of this Comment, a “minority jurisdiction” includes any state that has
allowed the recovery of punitive damages after the death of the tortfeasor by either appellate court
decision or statute.
90. See infra Appendix D.
91. See infra Appendix C.
92. Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.).
93. See Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520, 525 (Wyo. 1995); Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins.
Co., 871 P.2d 1343, 1351-52 (N.M. 1994); Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845, 846-47 (Fla. 1988);
Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982).
94. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 24.
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been compensated for their injuries by money damages. 95 Stated simply,
“the reason for awarding punitive damages ceases to exist with the death
of the tortfeasor.” 96
When rejecting the imposition of punitive damages against an
estate, most courts hold that a ruling to the contrary thwarts the two main
reasons for punitive awards. 97 Specifically, the retributive element of
punitive damages is extinguished by the death of the wrongdoer. 98
“Upon the death of the tortfeasor, the law can no longer punish
him . . . .” 99 Because punishment is a desired effect of punitive damages,
the victim should no longer be entitled to a punitive award when
punishment of the wrongdoer cannot be achieved. 100
The inability of courts to punish the deceased leaves only the theory
of deterrence to justify punitive awards against estates. However,
majority jurisdictions also agree that specific deterrence can no longer be
furthered after the tortfeasor’s death for the same reasons that a punitive
award can no longer punish a deceased tortfeasor. 101 The Florida
Supreme Court reasoned that “[i]f deterrence is justified in this instance,
it would also be justified to require a decedent’s family to pay a fine or
be imprisoned for the decedent’s criminal conduct.” 102 Courts adopting
the majority reasoning also opine that imposing punitive damages
against an estate punishes the tortfeasor’s innocent heirs for the
wrongdoing of the tortfeasor. 103 Moreover, “[w]ith the wrongdoer dead,
there is no one to punish, and to punish the innocent ignores [the] basic
philosophy of justice.” 104
In Lohr v. Byrd, the Florida Supreme Court considered whether
punitive damages could be awarded against a deceased tortfeasor’s
estate. 105 In Lohr, the plaintiff, Byrd, sued Lohr’s estate for
compensatory and punitive damages for injuries caused by an
automobile accident between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor, Lohr. 106
95. Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 846-47.
96. Parker, 889 P.2d at 525.
97. Id.
98. Id.; Jaramillo, 871 P.2d at 1351-52; Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 846-47; Thompson, 319 N.W.2d
at 408.
99. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 33 (Wise, J., dissenting).
100. Jaramillo, 871 P.2d at 1351.
101. See Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 847.
102. Id.
103. Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F. Supp. 1516, 1521-22 (D. Kan. 1991) (applying
Kansas law); Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 847.
104. Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 847.
105. Id. at 845.
106. Id. at 846.
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Lohr was intoxicated at the time of the accident and died as a result of
his sustained injuries. 107 The trial jury awarded the plaintiff $31,000 in
compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. 108 On appeal,
the defendant contended that “punitive damages are not proper against
the estate of a deceased tortfeasor, who is beyond material
punishment.” 109 The District Court of Appeals of Florida reduced the
issue to “whether the factor of deterrence of other potential tortfeasors,
standing alone, is a sufficient basis to sustain an award of punitive
damages against an estate” and ultimately answered the question
affirmatively. 110 The Florida Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding
that punitive damages could not be awarded against the deceased’s
estate. 111 The court acknowledged that punitive damages are imposed
only to punish the tortfeasor and deter others from similar conduct and
that the tortfeasor’s death left no one to punish. 112 The court further held
that “logic, common sense, and justice dictate that this [c]ourt follow the
majority of jurisdictions in this country.” 113
In the Whetstone dissent, Judge Wise succinctly outlined the
majority view:
Since deterring the actual tortfeasor is no longer a possibility or a
necessity, it is likewise no longer possible to hold him or her out as an
example to deter others. Punishing his or her Estate is one step
removed and therefore waters down or dilutes any such deterrent
effect. Assessing punitive damages against an estate serves to neither
punish nor deter the tortfeasor. I believe that separating the punishment
from the deterrent aspect frustrates the purpose of punitive damages
114
and that any deterrence would be speculative at best.

2. Minority Jurisdictions
A minority of jurisdictions has held that a claim for punitive
damages can survive the death of the tortfeasor and can be awarded
against a decedent’s estate. 115 Oklahoma and Texas allow for such
107. Id.
108. Id. The trial court thereafter granted the defendant’s remittitur as to the amount of
punitive damages and reduced that amount to $9,000. Id.
109. Byrd v. Lohr, 488 So. 2d 138, 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
110. Id. at 138-40.
111. Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 847.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.) (Wise, J.,
dissenting).
115. See Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 25; G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa.
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recovery by statute. 116 Most courts in the minority jurisdictions
emphasize general deterrence in allowing the recovery of punitive
damages against a decedent’s estate, while some give additional
reasons. 117
Pennsylvania endorses the traditional view that punitive damages
are meant to punish and deter certain behavior. 118 However, in G.J.D. v.
Johnson, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that imposing
punitive damages on a deceased tortfeasor’s estate would serve a
legitimate policy concern in deterring others from similar conduct. 119 In
G.J.D., an oft-cited case on this issue, the minor-plaintiff, G.J.D., was in
an intimate relationship with Thebes, during which Thebes took sexually
explicit photographs of G.J.D. 120 Upon G.J.D. ending the relationship,
Thebes distributed the photographs throughout the community. 121
Thereafter, G.J.D. brought suit against Thebes for defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other causes of
action. 122 However, Thebes committed suicide before the trial, and
Thebes’s sister, the executrix of his estate, was substituted as the
defendant. 123 The trial court awarded both compensatory and punitive
damages to G.J.D., and the issue of whether punitive damages should
have been awarded was appealed to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. 124
In its opinion, Pennsylvania’s high court extensively discussed the
jurisdictional split on the issue and ultimately sided with the minority. 125
The court’s decision rested on the theory of general deterrence.126
Specifically, the court stated that “[t]he deterrent effect on the conduct of
1998); Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 119 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc); Perry v. Melton,
299 S.E.2d 8, 13 (W. Va. 1982).
116. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 399 (End) of the First
Sess. of the 55th Legislature (2015)); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.008, 71.009
(West, Westlaw through end of 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 84th Legislature) (for wrongful death claims
only).
117. See Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 25; G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1131; Haralson, 31 P.3d at
116-17; Perry, 299 S.E.2d at 12-13.
118. “[P]unitive damages are awarded to punish a defendant for certain outrageous acts and to
deter him or others from engaging in similar conduct.” G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1131 (citing Kirkbride
v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800 (Pa. 1989)) (emphasis in original).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1128.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1128 (Pa. 1998).
124. Id. at 1128-29.
125. Id. at 1129-31.
126. Id. at 1131.
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others is no more speculative in the instant case than in cases where the
tortfeasor is alive.” 127 Furthermore, the court believed that the heirs of
Thebes’s estate would not be punished and, instead, would receive their
rightful inheritance. 128 Finally, the court was satisfied that other
safeguards, including jury instructions, were sufficient to safeguard
against a jury’s arbitrary imposition of punitive damages. 129
Similarly, minority courts have also held that awarding punitive
damages against a decedent’s estate may be appropriate to “express
society’s disapproval of outrageous conduct.” 130 In certain situations
where the tortfeasor is guilty of radical wrongdoing, such as bombings
and mass murders, the estate of the tortfeasor should not be shielded
from liability. 131 Other minority jurisdictions adopt similar general
deterrence arguments in support of the recovery of punitive damages
following the death of the tortfeasor. 132 Some minority courts further
their position by arguing that the tortfeasor’s innocent heirs are not
punished when punitive damages are assessed against the tortfeasor’s
estate. In G.J.D., the court stated that “[t]he heirs of the decedent
tortfeasor are in essentially the same financial position as if the
tortfeasor were living at the time damages were awarded.” 133 Thus, the
estate’s inheritance is “generally contingent upon the obligations
incurred by the deceased during his or her lifetime.” 134 The heirs of the
estate, then, still receive the assets rightfully owed to them.
Other minority jurisdictions do not award punitive damages
exclusively for the purposes of punishment and deterrence. In Hofer v.
Lavender, the Supreme Court of Texas reaffirmed state common law in
holding that punitive damages could be awarded “to reimburse for losses
too remote to be considered as elements of strict compensation” and “for
inconvenience and attorney’s fees” in addition to punishment and
deterrence. 135 Similarly, in Michigan, the express purpose of exemplary
damages is to make the plaintiff whole. 136 Specifically, a punitive award
127. Id.
128. G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 1998).
129. Id.
130. Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 117 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
131. Id.
132. See Penberthy v. Price, 666 N.E.2d 352, 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding general
deterrence and the “strong public policy against mixing alcohol and automobiles” justified the
recovery of punitive damages following the death of the tortfeasor).
133. G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1131.
134. Haralson, 31 P.3d at 118.
135. 679 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex. 1984).
136. Unibar Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Saigh, 769 N.W.2d 911, 923 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (per
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may supplement an insufficient compensatory award. 137 Thus, where the
defendant maliciously injures the plaintiff, the injured party may recover
punitive damages for humiliation and indignity. 138 Although the
Michigan Supreme Court has not sided with the majority or minority,
the state’s purposes for awarding punitive damages align more closely
with the minority reasoning for awarding such damages against
estates. 139
In addition, minority courts argue that arbitrary punitive damage
awards are safeguarded by the fact that the fact-finder may consider that
the tortfeasor is deceased in deciding whether to award punitive
damages. 140 Furthermore, the fact-finder will be aware that any award of
punitive damages would be assessed against the tortfeasor’s estate. 141
Adequate safeguards exist, and should be utilized, to protect against
arbitrary, exorbitant, or otherwise improper verdicts. Jurors should be
instructed to consider all aspects of fairness and justice in deciding
whether, and in what amount, to award punitive damages. This would
142
include the value of the estate and hardship to the heirs.

Furthermore, the jury may decline to award punitive damages
altogether. 143 Where the court finds the award outrageous, the judge may
grant a remittitur or new trial. 144
In all, minority jurisdictions offer several arguments in support of
allowing punitive damages to be assessed against estates. Some states
differ in their purposes for awarding punitive damages. A few
jurisdictions do not impose punitive damages solely to punish and deter
certain conduct and instead place more emphasis on the plaintiff. The
reasoning adopted by most minority courts in these cases is the theory of
general deterrence. In other words, discouraging others in society from
committing similar conduct is enough to justify awarding punitive
damages against a decedent’s estate.

curiam) (citing Hayes-Albion Corp. v. Kuberski, 364 N.W.2d 609 (Mich. 1984)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 923-24 (citing Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 1980)).
139. See generally Iversen, supra note 86.
140. G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 1998).
141. Id.
142. Haralson v. Fisher Surverying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 119 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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III. THE IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST TORTFEASORS’
ESTATES
“[T]he realm of the dead is not invaded, and punishment [is not]
visited upon the dead.” 145 Ohio’s survival statute ensures that a plaintiff
will likely retain an interest in a cause of action against a deceased
tortfeasor. However, a plaintiff should have no personal interest in the
punishment of the deceased. This section discusses and analyzes the two
main purposes of punitive damages in Ohio and the seminal Ohio cases
that discuss punitive awards where a party to the case is deceased. An
examination of the foregoing leads to the conclusion that imposing
punitive damages against deceased tortfeasors’ estates is contrary to
Ohio statutory and common law and raises major policy concerns.
A. The Whetstone Holding is Contrary to Ohio Common Law
Punitive damages are similar in nature to criminal punishments.
Punishment for committing a crime is a general principle of criminal
law. 146 The theory of retributive justice provides that the wrongdoer
should be punished in proportion to the crime committed. 147 The
doctrine of punitive damages was developed on similar principles, and
punishment remains an integral purpose for awarding such damages in
most jurisdictions. 148 However, the punishment aspect of punitive
damages is thwarted where the tortfeasor is deceased. The wrongdoer
cannot be reprimanded for the tort when that person is not alive to accept
the punishment. Similarly, some courts have held that a criminal
proceeding abates upon the death of the accused because any further
action would be moot. 149 Because the Supreme Court of Ohio has
consistently held that punishment is one aspect of punitive damages,
awarding such damages where the tortfeasor is deceased would be
contrary to that expressed purpose.
Deterrence is also a principle of criminal law. 150 There are two

145. Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891), abrogated by Glaskox v. Glaskox,
614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992).
146. See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 870 Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015).
147. Id.
148. See Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St. 3d 77, 2002-Ohio-7113,
781 N.E.2d 121, ¶ 178.
149. State v. Hoxsie, 1997 SD 119, ¶ 14, 570 N.W.2d 379, 382. The defendant in Hoxsie died
during a pending appeal of his conviction. In holding that any further action was moot, the South
Dakota Supreme Court highlighted the majority and minority views concerning the abatement of
criminal proceedings following the death of the accused. Id. at ¶ 5-12, 570 N.W.2d at 379-82.
150. See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 870 Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015).
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types of deterrence: specific and general. In penalizing the wrongdoer,
specific deterrence discourages the criminal from committing the crime
again. 151 In contrast, general deterrence discourages others in society
from committing similar conduct. 152 For the same reasons that a
deceased tortfeasor cannot be punished, the tortfeasor cannot be
specifically deterred from committing similar conduct again in the
future. However, many minority courts rely on the theory of general
deterrence alone in justifying the allowance of punitive damages against
a deceased tortfeasor’s estate. 153
The Supreme Court of Ohio has acknowledged a plaintiff’s right to
recover punitive damages in tort actions since as early as 1857.154 In
developing the common law doctrine, the Court has repeatedly
reinforced the traditional twin aims of awarding punitive damages:
punishment and deterrence. 155 Specifically, “[t]he policy for awarding
punitive damages in Ohio ‘. . . has been recognized . . . as that of
punishing the offending party and setting him up as an example to others
that they might be deterred from similar conduct.’” 156 Furthermore, the
Court has expressed that punitive awards are “more about a defendant’s
behavior than the plaintiff’s loss.” 157 The purposes for which Ohio
courts impose punitive damages are consistent with the majority position
that punitive damages do not survive the death of the tortfeasor. Thus,
the Whetstone holding to the contrary is inconsistent with Ohio common
law.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has never opined on the issue of
whether punitive damages should be imposed against a decedent’s
estate. Disallowing the recovery of such damages, however, would be
consistent with the Court’s historical interpretation of punitive damages.
Punishment and deterrence are the only espoused purposes for
exemplary damages in Ohio. 158 The tortfeasor must be chastised for
151. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 51 (6th ed. 2012).
152. Id. at 50.
153. See, e.g., Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.); G.J.D.
v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 1998); Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 119
(Ariz. 2001) (en banc).
154. See Timberlake v. Cincinnati Gazette Co., 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint 646 (1857).
155. See Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St. 3d 77, 2002-Ohio-7113,
781 N.E.2d 121, ¶ 178; Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp., 715 N.E.2d 546, 553 (Ohio 1999).;
Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 343 (Ohio 1994); Preston v. Murty, 512 N.E.2d
1174, 1176 (Ohio 1987).
156. Preston, 512 N.E.2d at 1176 (citing Detling v. Chockley, 436 N.E.2d 208, 209 (Ohio
1982), overruled on other grounds).
157. Wightman, 715 N.E.2d at 553.
158. See Dardinger at ¶ 178; Wightman, 715 N.E.2d at 553; Moskovitz, 635 N.E.2d at 343;

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

19

Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 13

572

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[49:553

wrongdoing, discouraged from committing the act again, and publicly
made an example of to deter others from similar conduct. However,
under the minority view, there is only a potential, not a certainty, that
society may be deterred from similar conduct.
The Ohio appellate court stated, in Whetstone, that “the death of the
tortfeasor does not completely thwart the purposes underlying the award
of punitive damages.” 159 The court was satisfied by the fact that punitive
damages might deter others from committing similar conduct. 160
However, the court’s rationale is inconsistent with the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s interpretation of punitive damages. General deterrence is aimed
at the behavior of others in society, while specific deterrence addresses
the tortfeasor specifically. Although “society” or “the general public”
inherently includes the tortfeasor, general deterrence is more concerned
with discouraging others in society from committing similar conduct.
Though the tortfeasor’s malicious behavior remains the cause for
recovery of punitive damages, such damages cannot be justified solely
on the theory of general deterrence. In declining to award punitive
damages against an estate based on deterring society in general, one
court held that “punitive damages by way of example to others should be
imposed only on actual wrongdoers.” 161
If courts must resort to the theory of general deterrence to justify
awarding punitive damages against an estate, traditional compensatory
damages should suffice. The threat of compensatory damages alone
should be sufficient to deter the general public from committing similar
conduct. In Whetstone, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs $500 for lost
wages, $1,000 for emotional distress, and $50,000 for physical injury,
emotional harm, and distress. 162 The $51,500 in compensatory damages
assessed against the deceased’s estate should be sufficient to generally
deter others from like behavior. It would be a rare situation where a
potential tortfeasor would not be deterred by the threat of compensatory
damages, but, nevertheless, would be deterred by the possibility of
punitive damages for the same conduct. It would be the extremely
wealthy tortfeasor, indeed, who would be discouraged by punitive
damages alone.
General deterrence alone is too removed from the tortfeasor’s
Preston, 512 N.E.2d at 1176.
159. Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.).
160. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 27.
161. Evans v. Gibson, 31 P.2d 389, 395 (Cal. 1934) (per curiam) (emphasis added). The
phrase “actual wrongdoers” referred to living tortfeasors.
162. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 10.
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actions to justify an award of punitive damages. It is unlikely that a
potential wrongdoer would consider the effects of her actions on the
heirs of her estate before committing a tort. In contrast, punishment of
the tortfeasor is directly related to the tortfeasor’s actions. Retribution
for wrongdoing can be monetarily assessed against the tortfeasor and is a
necessary component to an award for punitive damages. Thus, because
Ohio courts emphasize punishment and deterrence, rather than
punishment or deterrence, as the goals of punitive damages, the
Whetstone holding is contrary to the established state common law.
B. The Rubeck Decision is Not Binding on the Issue in Whetstone
The Whetstone court found support for its decision from the
Supreme Court of Ohio decision in Rubeck v. Huffman 163 and R.C.
2305.21. 164 In Whetstone, the court conceded that both the survival
statute and the Rubeck decision are silent as to the imposition of punitive
damages against an estate. 165 Nevertheless, the Whetstone court held that
the statute and case, taken together, provided persuasive authority to
dispose of the issue. 166
In Rubeck, the defendant, Huffman, was driving an automobile in
the wrong direction on a state highway when he struck and killed
Rubeck in a head-on collision. 167 Rubeck’s next of kin filed a wrongful
death action against Huffman for negligence and sought $400 in
property damage and personal injuries, $97,700 in pecuniary damages,
and $100,000 in punitive damages. 168 The trial court awarded the
plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages. 169 In Ohio, punitive
damages are not recoverable in a wrongful death action. 170 Thus, for the
trial court’s award of punitive damages to be upheld, Rubeck’s estate
had to prove “that the deceased suffered personal injury or property loss

163. 374 N.E.2d 411 (Ohio 1978) (per curiam). See also Shaefer v. D & J Produce, Inc., 403
N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (holding, on facts similar to Rubeck, that the owner of a
truck involved in a fatal accident may be liable for punitive damages due to injuries sustained by
plaintiff’s decedent who allegedly died as a result of the accident).
164. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass.
2015-2016).
165. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 26.
166. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶26.
167. Rubeck, 374 N.E.2d at 412.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass.
2015-2016). See also Rubeck, 374 N.E.2d at 413.
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as a result of the collision and before he died . . . .” 171 The court held,
pursuant to R.C. 2305.21, that “the right to . . . [punitive] damages
continues even when the person so injured has died and the personal
injury or property loss is pursued by the representative of his
estate . . . .” 172
The Whetstone court opined that Rubeck, in conjunction with R.C.
2305.21, stands for the proposition that all causes of action, including all
elements of recovery, survive the death of the plaintiff or the
tortfeasor. 173 In essence, the court held that because a claim for punitive
damages survives the death of a plaintiff under R.C. 2305.21, then the
same claim can survive the death of a tortfeasor for the same
reasoning. 174 However, the court’s reliance on Rubeck is inconsistent
with the purposes for awarding punitive damages and the Supreme Court
of Ohio’s prior decisions.
The death of a plaintiff before trial should be distinguished and
treated differently than the death of a defendant in a tort action where the
plaintiff seeks punitive damages. Simply put, in Ohio, a punitive award
is not concerned with the harm to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is merely
responsible for presenting evidence that the defendant acted maliciously,
which entitles the plaintiff to punitive damages. Thus, whether the
plaintiff is living or deceased is immaterial to the fact-finder’s decision
to award punitive damages. In contrast, punitive awards in Ohio are
based solely on the defendant’s behavior. 175 Where the defendant is
deceased, the reasons behind punitive damages are no longer furthered.
In a case such as Rubeck, where the plaintiff’s estate (or next of kin)
seeks punitive damages from a living defendant, the goals of punishment
and deterrence of the defendant are not frustrated. A living defendant
can be punished and made “an example to others that they might be
deterred from similar conduct.” 176
Also, the facts of Whetstone are distinguishable from the facts of
Rubeck. Whetstone involved a living parent-guardian and two living
minors as plaintiffs. The tortfeasor in Whetstone was alive at the time of
the misconduct but died before the commencement of a hearing on the
171. Rubeck, 374 N.E.2d at 413-14.
172. Id. at 413. The Court nevertheless held that the plaintiff did not prove that the decedent
suffered property damage or personal injury as a result of the collision. Id. at 414. Thus, Rubeck
was not entitled to punitive damages. Id.
173. Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.).
174. Id.
175. Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St.3d 77, 2002-Ohio-7113, 781
N.E.2d 121, ¶ 178.
176. Preston v. Murty, 512 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ohio 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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issue of damages. 177 In contrast, the plaintiff in Rubeck was deceased at
the time of the trial while the defendant-tortfeasor was still living. 178 The
position of the deceased party as plaintiff or defendant directly affects
the efficacy of a punitive damages award. In a case like Rubeck, the twin
aims of punishment and deterrence can be pursued against a living
defendant. However, those same purposes are severely frustrated where
the tortfeasor is deceased, as was the case in Whetstone.
C. The Whetstone Holding is Not Supported by Ohio Statutory Law
The Ohio legislature has adopted a statute that expressly provides
the elements of recovery for punitive damages. 179 However, the punitive
damages statute gives no guidance as to the recovery of punitive
damages against an estate. Ohio courts deciding the issue, therefore,
look exclusively to the survival statute, R.C. 2305.21. The Whetstone
court found support for its conclusion in R.C. 2305.21, which is silent as
to the recovery of punitive damages. 180 Revised Code 2305.21 allows
plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages as if the deceased party were
alive at the time of the trial. 181 However, punitive damages are different
in nature from compensatory damages. In Ohio, where compensatory
damages are awarded to make the plaintiff whole, punitive damages are
meant only to punish and deter the defendant. In awarding punitive
damages, the finder of fact assumes compensatory damages are not only
necessary, but have already been awarded to the injured party. 182
Because the survival statute does not expressly allow claims for punitive
damages against estates, Ohio courts should be hesitant to include them
because such inclusion upsets the established doctrine of punitive
awards.
Allowing the recovery of compensatory damages pursuant to R.C.
2305.21 is necessary for the proper administration of justice.
Compensating a plaintiff for a legally recognized harm is the basis for an
action in tort. If R.C. 2305.21 forbade the injured party from being made
whole, one important goal of filing suit, obtaining damages would be
completely extinguished. However, in order to recover punitive damages
177. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶¶ 3, 6.
178. Rubeck v. Huffman, 374 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Ohio 1978) (per curiam).
179. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass.
2015-2016).
180. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 26.
181. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 26.
182. § 2315.21(C)(2) (Westlaw). Compensatory damages are a necessary prerequisite to
punitive damages. See § 2315.21(B)(1)(b) (Westlaw).
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in Ohio, compensatory damages must have already been awarded. 183 The
compensatory award should have, then, already made the plaintiff
whole. 184 In contrast, punitive damages go far beyond the purposes of
compensatory damages. Such awards are further removed from the
plaintiff and are not necessary to make the injured party whole.
Awarding punitive damages after the death of the party liable thereto is,
therefore, inconsistent with the doctrine of punitive damages and
unnecessary to further compensate the injured plaintiff.
The Individual Business Services v. Carmack case, 185 an Ohio
Common Pleas Court decision cited in Whetstone, held that even though
R.C. 2305.21 is silent as to the recovery of punitive damages, such
damages are a “component” of an action for fraud, and thus, the statute
allowed for the recovery of punitive damages against an estate.186 The
Individual Business Services court essentially concluded that because
R.C. 2305.21 allows an action for fraud to survive the death of a litigant
and because one can recover punitive damages for fraud, such damages
may automatically be recovered against a deceased tortfeasor’s estate in
all causes of action under R.C. 2305.21. 187 However, the court’s analysis
bypasses the issue. While it is true that punitive damages can be
recovered in a fraud case, that fact alone is no basis for concluding that
punitive damages can be awarded against an estate. Punitive damages
are a “component” of several causes of actions in that it is possible for
the plaintiff to recover them. The Individual Business Services court,
however, declined to address the propriety of issuing punitive damages
against an estate and did not reconcile the fact that a punitive award in
that situation frustrates both the retributive and deterrent aspects of such
damages. 188 Instead, the court took the easy way out by holding that
because an action for fraud survives the death of a litigant, punitive
damages can be recovered for fraud, and thus, punitive damages survive
as well.

183.

Niskanen v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 122 Ohio St. 3d 486, 2009-Ohio-3626, 912 N.E.2d 595, ¶

13.
184. There are, of course, some circumstances, such as where the plaintiff seeks injunctive
relief, where monetary damages are an insufficient remedy to make the plaintiff whole.
185. Montgomery C.P. No. 2004 CV 08159, 2009 WL 8235992 (Dec. 17, 2009).
186. Id. at *3.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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D. A Claim for Punitive Damages is Not a “Cause of Action” for
Purposes of Ohio’s Survivor Statute
A “cause of action” describes “[a] group of operative facts giving
rise to one or more bases for suing” or “a factual situation that entitles
one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person.” 189 It is
simply the theory for a lawsuit. Damages, in contrast, are awards
“claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss
or injury.” 190 Thus, a plaintiff has no ability to institute a cause of action
simply “for damages.” Rather, a plaintiff must sue a defendant under a
distinct cause of action and, through that mechanism, seek damages.
Actionable offenses include, among countless others, assault, battery,
negligence, and breach of contract. A proven assault entitles a plaintiff
to a remedy in court from another person. A cause of action for assault
gives the victim a basis for suing, while damages are merely the remedy.
The cause of action is usually the beginning of the judicial process,
while an award of damages likely ends the process.
The Iowa Supreme Court was recently faced with a case analogous
to Whetstone involving many of the same arguments. 191 Iowa, like Ohio,
codified the justification for recovering punitive damages. 192
Furthermore, the Iowa legislature enacted a survival statute nearly
identical to that of Ohio. 193 In In re Estate of Vajgrt, the Iowa Supreme
Court considered whether the right to recover punitive damages survives
the death of the tortfeasor. 194 The proponent for recovering exemplary
damages argued, among other things, that Iowa’s survivor statute should
allow the recovery of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor’s
estate. 195 Nevertheless, the court reaffirmed its position with the majority
jurisdictions in holding that punitive damages could not be awarded
against the estate. 196 The court held that “punitive damages do not
constitute a distinct ‘cause of action’” for purposes of the Iowa Survival
Statute. 197 Instead, the court classified exemplary damages as “a form of
relief incidental to the main cause of action” that is not encompassed by

189. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (9th ed. 2009).
190. Id. at 444.
191. In re Estate of Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 2011).
192. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West, Westlaw through end of 2015 Reg. Sess.).
193. “All causes of action shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of the
person entitled or liable to the same.” § 611.20 (Westlaw).
194. 801 N.W.2d at 572.
195. Id. at 573-74.
196. Id. at 577-78.
197. Id. at 574.
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the statute. 198
In contrast, the Whetstone court held that R.C. 2305.21, taken
together with the Rubeck opinion, stands for the proposition that “all
causes of action, including all elements of recovery, survive as if the
deceased party were still alive both on behalf of the estate of decedent
and against the estate of the tortfeasor.” 199 However, the court’s blanket
inclusion of “all causes of action” is inconsistent with both the text and
judicial interpretations of the statute. The statute allows all common law
actions to survive. 200 In addition, actions for mesne profits, injuries to
the person or property, deceit, and fraud also survive the death of the
person entitled or liable thereto. 201 All other causes of action not
mentioned do not survive pursuant to R.C. 2305.21. 202 Furthermore,
Ohio courts have held that several causes of action do not survive under
the statute. 203 The Whetstone court’s interpretation of the statute’s
language is more consistent with other states’ survival statutes, such as
Michigan’s, which provides that “[a]ll actions and claims survive
death.” 204 The Michigan legislature’s inclusion of all actions and claims
provides a clearer intent that all elements of recovery are intended to
survive the tortfeasor’s death. However, the Ohio statute, which merely
refers to “causes of action,” provides a much weaker basis for the
inclusion of claims for punitive damages.
It follows, then, that there can be no cause of action for punitive
damages in Ohio under the survivor statute. The “causes of action” and
“actions” described by R.C. 2305.21 expressly include common law
causes of action, causes of action for mesne profits, personal and
proprietal injuries, fraud, and deceit. 205 Remedies, specifically punitive
damages, are not mentioned in the statute as a cause of action, and a

198. Id. (citing Sebastian v. Wood, 66 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Iowa 1954)).
199. Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.).
200. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass.
2015-2016).
201. § 2305.21 (Westlaw).
202. § 2305.21 (Westlaw).
203. See Hook v. Springfield, 750 N.E.2d 1162, 1167 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (worker’s
compensation); Oakwood v. Makar, 463 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (slander); Stein-Sapir
v. Birdsell, 673 F.2d 165, 167 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (applying Ohio law) (libel); Alsup v.
Int’l Union of Bricklayers, 679 F. Supp. 716, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (applying Ohio law) (violation
of civil rights); State ex rel. Crow v. Weygandt, 162 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ohio 1959) (malicious
prosecution).
204. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2921 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2015, No. 172 of the 2015
Reg. Sess., 98th Legislature). See also Iversen, supra note 75, at 838.
205. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass.
2015-2016).
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cause of action distinctly seeking damages does not coincide with the
text of the statute or the meaning of “cause of action.” Thus, merely
because the statute permits certain actions to survive the death of a
litigant does not also mean that all elements of recovery in those actions
automatically survive as well.
IV. POLICY AND PRESCRIPTION OF IMPOSING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AGAINST AN ESTATE IN OHIO
This section discusses the policy implications of the Whetstone
decision and offers ways to achieve change. Part A discusses the
negative outcomes that flow from imposing punitive damages against
deceased tortfeasors. Part B discusses the positive policy implications of
the majority view. Part C offers methods of changing the current Ohio
law, including through the courts and legislature.
A. Negative Ramifications of the Minority Position
Majority jurisdictions have repeatedly held that “[t]here is a strong
policy against the assessment of punitive damages against an estate on
account of the wrongful conduct of the decedent.” 206 Where the core
principles of any legal doctrine are not furthered, there is bound to be a
negative impact on society. The holding in Whetstone is no different as it
allows punitive awards to punish the tortfeasor’s innocent heirs and
denies the tortfeasor the ability to repudiate the claim.
“To allow exemplary damages now would be to punish his legal
and personal representatives for his wrongful act, but the civil law never
inflicts vicarious punishment.” 207 The law should not delegate the
punishment of one party (the tortfeasor) to an innocent third party (the
tortfeasor’s heirs). In effect, the minority view reaches far beyond the
wrongdoer, possibly into the lives of the tortfeasor’s family, friends, and
other loved ones. A punitive award should only punish the tortfeasor, not
innocent third parties. Punishing the estate’s innocent heirs has the
unwanted policy effect of allowing a claim for punitive damages to
survive the death of the tortfeasor that “waters down or dilutes any . . .
effect” of punitive damages. 208 Furthermore, “to punish the estate
ignores the central purpose of punitive damages, which is to punish the
206. Flaum v. Birnbaum, 582 N.Y.S.2d 853, 857 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
207. In re Estate of Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Sheik v. Hobson, 19
N.W. 875, 875-76 (Iowa 1884) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
208. Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.) (Wise, J.,
dissenting).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

27

Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 13

580

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[49:553

tortfeasor and to deter him from repeating the wrongful act.” 209
In addition, a deceased defendant is no longer available to testify. 210
Typically, in an adversarial justice system, both the plaintiff and
defendant are able to tell their side of the story, ensuring a truer form of
justice. However, where the defendant is deceased, one side of the story
is silenced. 211 This poses no problem for a compensatory award as such
an award is focused on the plaintiff and making the plaintiff whole,
rather than the defendant’s wrongdoing. Although others may testify to
the facts surrounding the case, only the defendant can effectively combat
a claim for punitive damages. The wrongdoer must be present to testify
as to how he did not act maliciously in order to refute the elements for
the recovery of punitive damages. Where punitive damages may be
awarded against an estate, the fact-finder is able to punish the estate’s
innocent heirs, and the tortfeasor has no chance to personally repudiate
the claim.
B. Positive Ramifications of the Majority Position
A holding that punitive damages cannot be imposed against an
estate would create positive policy implications. Most importantly, the
majority view reinforces the traditional aims of punitive awards. Both
punishment and deterrence can be accomplished by imposing punitive
damages against a living defendant. In addition, the minority’s overemphasis on the deterrent effect of punitive damages in this situation
ultimately undermines the policy behind the substantive law. 212 The
majority view, in contrast, stays true to the twin aims, rather than placing
too much weight and importance on deterrence alone. That is, under the
majority view, the goal is efficient and effective deterrence, not
deterrence at all costs. On the other hand, the minority view clings to the
theory of general deterrence and, in turn, overplays the traditional
reasons for imposing punitive damages. While the minority view strays
from the express purposes of punitive damages and focuses solely on
general deterrence, the majority position furthers the purposes for
punitive awards that have been repeatedly accepted by Ohio courts.
Furthermore, this issue goes beyond the realm of the law and into
209. Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 871 P.2d 1343, 1351 (N.M. 1994) (emphasis
added).
210. Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d at 573.
211. This is, of course, true in any action where a litigant is deceased. However, as the express
purposes of punitive damages are different than any other civil remedy, it is worth noting that the
tortfeasor is prohibited from testifying.
212. The underlying policy is, of course, the punishment and deterrence of the tortfeasor.
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the realm of the dead. 213 Rather than add insult to injury (or more
accurately, add insult to death), the law should afford some level of
respect to the deceased. The majority view does just that. Punishment for
wrongdoing must stop at the grave, and the wrongdoer’s friends and
family must not be subjected to additional pain and suffering at the
hands of the law. In order to maintain the integrity of the deceased and
provide the respect that they deserve, no Ohio law should go as far as
punishing the dead. The majority view upholds these basic principles.
C. Prescription for Change
This subsection discusses the possible avenues for achieving
change in the current Ohio laws concerning the imposition of punitive
damages against estates. Part 1 examines change through the courts,
which is the most likely possibility because this issue is currently under
consideration in the Supreme Court of Ohio. Part 2 discusses a viable
alternative: change though legislative action.
1. Achieving Change Through the Courts
The Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Whetstone provides no
certainty to the law in Ohio, except in the limited circumstances of that
case. The Court did not announce a bright line rule as to whether
punitive damages may be imposed against an estate. A different set of
facts could bring the issue before the Court again in the future. For
example, the Court’s holding in Whetstone would not be applicable in a
case where the tortfeasor dies after the trial court renders a judgment
against her. In that case, an Ohio court would not be bound by the
Court’s decision, unless the court is in the Fifth Appellate District. 214 If
given another opportunity, the Supreme Court should reconcile the
holding in Rubeck 215 with more recent decisions, including the appellate
decision in Whetstone, 216 Mongold, 217 and Individual Business
Services. 218 Given the possibility of future inconsistent decisions among
Ohio courts, the Supreme Court of Ohio should declare the state’s
213. See Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891), abrogated by Glaskox v.
Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992).
214. See Section IV.C.2, infra.
215. Rubeck v. Huffman, 374 N.E.2d 411 (Ohio 1978) (per curiam).
216. Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905 (5th Dist.).
217. Mongold v. Estate of Gilbert, 114 Ohio Misc. 2d 32, 758 N.E.2d 1245 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
2000).
218. See Individual Bus. Servs., Inc. v Carmack, Montgomery C.P. No. 2004 CV 08159, 2009
WL 8235992 (Dec. 17, 2009).
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position once and for all.
2. Achieving Change Through the Legislature
As aforementioned, uncertainty remains after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Whetstone. The rule expressed by the appellate court in
Whetstone is now the law of the Fifth Appellate District in Ohio. Though
the court’s holding is not legally binding on the entire state, other
appellate districts may look to Whetstone in forming an opinion as to
whether punitive damages may be imposed against estates. An appellate
decision can be persuasive to other appellate districts, especially when
the deciding district has not opined on the issue. Given the likelihood
that other appellate courts will be faced with the problem of whether to
assess punitive damages against an estate, the Ohio legislature may be
better suited to decide the issue than the courts.
Ohio is composed of twelve appellate districts. 219 If faced with the
issue, each district court of appeals could arrive at different conclusions.
Furthermore, each court could employ different reasoning for its
disposition. Such conflicting opinions would further confuse the
purposes and policies of punitive damages in Ohio. The Ohio General
Assembly could curtail future problems with an amendment to an
existing statute or the adoption of a new law addressing whether punitive
damages can be awarded against a deceased tortfeasor’s estate. Ohio
could look to other jurisdictions in crafting a bright-line rule on the
issue.
Sixteen other states have settled the issue through statute. 220 The
legislatures in those states have addressed the specific question of
whether courts and juries can impose punitive damages against a
deceased tortfeasor’s estate. Nearly ninety percent of them codified the
conclusion that punitive damages do not survive the death of the
tortfeasor. 221 The California survival statute, last amended in 1992, states
that all damages are recoverable against a decedent’s estate as if the
decedent were living “except . . . punitive or exemplary damages.” 222
The New York survival statute, last amended in 1982, provides: “For
any injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal
219.

See The Supreme Court of Ohio & The Ohio Judicial System, Ohio Courts of Appeal,
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/judsystem/districtcourts/
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2015).
220. See infra Appendices B and D.
221. See infra Appendix B.
222. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.42 (West, Westlaw through emergency leg. through Ch.
807 of 2015 Reg. Sess.).
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representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be
awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover
damages for personal injury.” 223
Most other jurisdictions addressing the imposition of punitive
damages after the death of the tortfeasor have remedied the issue
through the state’s survival statutes. Ohio’s survival statute (R.C.
2305.21) has not been revised since its adoption in 1953, 224 and there
have been no issues that call for a reinterpretation of the statute until
Whetstone. The Ohio legislature, however, has passed a lengthy statute
addressing the recovery of punitive damages, which was last amended in
2005. 225 The General Assembly revised Ohio’s punitive damages law,
but declined to address the issue here. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
of Ohio “places little weight on legislative inaction as a barometer for
determining legislative intent . . . .” 226 Therefore, the legislature’s silence
on whether to impose punitive damages against estates does not indicate
its intent to side with the majority or minority.
Though an Ohio appellate court had not yet decided if punitive
damages could be imposed against an estate in 2005 (when the punitive
damages statute was revised), the Supreme Court had considered
whether a plaintiff’s estate was entitled to such damages in Rubeck, and
at least one Ohio trial court had opined that punitive damages could not
survive the death of the tortfeasor.227 If the Ohio legislature intended a
result to the contrary, it has had ample opportunities to add a provision
to either the punitive damages statute or the survival statute.
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “legislative
inaction in the face of longstanding judicial interpretations of that
section [of a statute] evidences legislative intent to retain existing
law.” 228 Furthermore, “[i]n interpreting the meaning of legislative
language, it is not unimportant that the General Assembly has failed to
amend the legislation subsequent to a prior interpretation thereof by [the
Supreme Court of Ohio].” 229 Based on the court’s longstanding statutory
223. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-3.2 (McKinney’s, Westlaw through L.2015,
chps. 1 to 417).
224. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (West, West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st
Gen. Ass. 2015-2016).
225. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (West, West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st
Gen. Ass. 2015-2016).
226. Roosevelt Prop. Co. v. Kinney, 465 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ohio 1984) (per curiam).
227. Mongold v. Estate of Gilbert, 114 Ohio Misc. 2d 32, 758 N.E.2d 1245 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
2000).
228. State v. Cichon, 399 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ohio 1980).
229. Seeley v. Expert, Inc., 269 N.E.2d 121, 129 (Ohio 1971) (citing Mahoning Valley Ry.
Co. v. Van Alstine, 83 N.E. 601 (Ohio 1908)).
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interpretation law, it seems clear that the General Assembly has
acquiesced to the 1978 Rubeck decision due to its failure to subsequently
amend the law. Yet, the legislature’s silence on the issue here provides
no guidance as to legislative intent because the issue has not reached the
Supreme Court of Ohio and has only recently been reviewed by an Ohio
appellate court. In any event, if the legislature decides to address the
issue, it should adopt the majority view. 230 Ohio statutory and common
law support the position that punitive damages should not be imposed
against a deceased tortfeasor’s estate.
V. CONCLUSION
In Ohio, only two specific purposes justify an award for punitive
damages. Both punishment and deterrence must be satisfied in order for
a fact-finder to impose punitive damages against a tortfeasor. However,
where the tortfeasor dies before the damages are awarded, these
purposes are severely frustrated. Punitive damages cannot punish a
deceased tortfeasor because the wrongdoer can no longer be physically
reprimanded. Furthermore, a deceased tortfeasor can no longer be
deterred from similar conduct in the future. General deterrence is the
only reasonable justification for awarding punitive damages against an
estate. Yet, it seems highly unlikely that the distant threat of punitive
damages will deter others in society from maliciously committing torts.
Ohio statutory law is also consistent with the majority view. Ohio’s
punitive damages statute and survival statute are both silent as to the
issue at bar. However, the express language of each statute, considered
separately or taken together, align with the position that does not allow
punitive damages to survive the death of the tortfeasor. In addition,
negative policy implications arise from the minority view, while the
majority view suggests positive policy outcomes. Given the recent
Supreme Court decision in Whetstone and the continuing potential for
conflicting opinions among Ohio appellate courts, the legislature may be
in a better position than the courts to dispose of the matter. In any event,
whether accomplished judicially or statutorily, Ohio should align with
the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a claim for punitive damages
cannot survive the death of the tortfeasor.

230. The issue would certainly be ripe for legislative action if another Ohio appellate court
issues a conflicting opinion.
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VI. APPENDICES 231
Appendix A—Majority View-Judicial Adoption
Alaska—Doe v. Colligan, 753 P.2d 144 (Alaska 1988).
District of Columbia—Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665
A.2d 929 (D.C. 1995), opinion amended on denial of rehearing by
Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 681 A.2d 1097 (D.C. 1996).
Florida—Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988).
Indiana—Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d
135 (Ind. 2005).
Iowa—In re Estate of Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 2011).
Kansas—Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F. Supp. 1516 (D.
Kan. 1991) (applying Kansas law).
Kentucky—Stewart v. Estate of Cooper, 102 S.W.3d 913 (Ky.
2003).
Minnesota—Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400
(Minn. 1982).
Missouri—Tietjens v. Gen. Motors Corp., 418 S.W.2d 75 (Mo.
1967).
New Mexico—Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 871 P.2d
1343 (N.M. 1994).
North Carolina—Harrell v. Bowen, 655 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. 2008).
South Dakota—Olson-Roti v. Kilcoin, 2002 SD 131, 653 N.W.2d
254.
Tennessee—Hayes v. Gill, 390 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. 1965).
Wyoming—Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520 (Wyo. 1995).
Appendix B—Majority View-Statutory Adoption
California—CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.42 (West 2014).
Colorado—COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-101 (West 2014).
Georgia—GA. CODE ANN. § 9-2-41 (West 2014).
Idaho—IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-327 (West 2014).
Maine—ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3-818 (2014).
Massachusetts—MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 230, § 2 (West 2014).
Mississippi—MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-7-235 (West 2014).
231. The empirical data is based on several sources and my own research on the subject. See
G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1129-30 & nn.4 & 6 (Pa. 1998); Emily Himes Iversen, Note,
Invading The Realm Of The Dead: Exploring The (Im)propriety Of Punitive Damages Awards
Against Estates, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 827, 831-35 (2014); Timothy R. Robicheaux & Brian H.
Bornstein, Punished, Dead or Alive: Empirical Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages
Against Deceased Defendants, 16 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 393, 410 (2010); Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, Claim for Punitive Damages in Tort Action as Surviving Death of Tortfeasor or Person
Wronged, 30 A.L.R. 4TH 707 (1984).
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Nevada—NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.100 (West 2014).
New York—N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-3.2
(McKinney’s 2014).
Oregon—OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.080 (West 1983).
Rhode Island—R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-8 (West 2014).
Vermont—VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1454 (West 2014).
Virginia—VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-25 (West 2014).
Wisconsin—WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.02 (West 2014).
Appendix C—Minority View-Judicial Adoption
Alabama—Ellis v. Zuck, 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying
Alabama law).
Arizona—Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114 (Ariz.
2001) (en banc.).
Hawaii—Kaopuiki v. Kealoha, 87 P.3d 910 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003).
Illinois—Penberthy v. Price, 666 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
Montana—Tillett v. Lippert, 909 P.2d 1158 (Mont. 1996).
Ohio—Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905 (5th
Dist.).
Pennsylvania—G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127 (Pa. 1998).
South Carolina—In re Thomas, 254 B.R. 879 (D.S.C. 1999)
(applying South Carolina law).
West Virginia—Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982).
Appendix D—Minority View-Statutory Adoption
Texas—TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.008, 71.009
(West 2014).
Oklahoma—OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West 2014).
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